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# Fiscal Federalism of India: Unveiling Patterns in North-South Financial Dynamics

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#### Abstract

India's existing tax-sharing system under fiscal federalism has been crucial in fostering equity among states, ensuring that no region is overlooked. However, as the nation sets its sights on the Viksit Bharat @2047 vision, this system needs to adapt not only to maintain fairness but also to encourage efficiency, innovation, and results-focused governance. A revamped strategy that balances redistribution with rewards for fiscal responsibility is necessary to strengthen the cooperative nature of Indian federalism and promote comprehensive national advancement.

**Keywords:** Fiscal federalism; tax-sharing frameworks; fairness; efficiency; innovation; Viksit Bharat 2047; cooperative federalism; intergovernmental transfers; fiscal responsibility; state incentives.

#### 1. Introduction

India's constitutional framework establishes a distinctive system of fiscal federalism, reflecting its complex political, social, and economic history. This financial interaction between the Union government and the states is crucial in India's governance, influencing economic growth, resource allocation, and policy implementation across various regions. The country's fiscal federalism features a carefully designed division of fiscal responsibilities and revenue sources between central and state governments, enabling both levels to operate effectively. Notably, India diverges from typical federations, as the central government possesses significant authority to limit state rights and take control during crises, including financial emergencies.

# 2. Constitutional Architecture of Fiscal Federalism

Indian Constitution separates legislative, administrative, and fiscal authority between the Centre and the States using three lists in the Seventh Schedule: the Union List, the State List, and the Concurrent List. These divided powers are the backbone of India's fiscal federal setup, determining which governmental level can enact laws and collect certain revenues. Articles 268-293 in Part XII of the Constitution outline the financial interactions between the Centre and States. Tax powers are divided into five main categories:

- 1. Taxes imposed, collected, and kept by the Union.
- 2. Taxes imposed and collected by the Union but entirely assigned to the States.
- 3. Taxes imposed and collected by the Union with proceeds shared with States.
- 4. Taxes imposed by the Union but collected and kept by the States.
- 5. Taxes imposed, collected, and kept by States.

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# (IJRSSH) 2025, Vol. No. 15, Issue No. II, Apr-Jun

This setup was significantly altered by the 80th Amendment in 2000 and the 88th Amendment in 2003, fundamentally changing the distribution of tax revenues by allowing all central taxes to be shareable.

**Vertical Fiscal Imbalance in India:** Fiscal federalism displays a vertical imbalance between the capacity to generate revenue and the obligation to spend. States accounted for 62.4% of total expenditures (as of 2021), yet raised only 37% of total revenues. This imbalance is due to the Central government collecting more gross tax revenues, while states manage more development tasks, typically offering limited or no revenue. The Constitution set up measures to transfer resources from the Centre to the States to address this imbalance:

- The Finance Commission determines the states' share in Central taxes and grants from the Consolidated Fund of India.
- The former Planning Commission (replaced by NITI Aayog) recommended grants and loans for development spending.
- Centrally Sponsored Schemes are designed by various Central government ministries.

**Devolution of Funds from the Centre to the States:** The Centre and States are connected financially through a wellorganized transfer of resources, referred to as devolution of funds, guided by constitutional provisions ensuring equitable distribution and mitigating regional disparities. States generate about 40% of the revenue but spend around 60%, making this system crucial to sustaining financial equilibrium across India's varied regions.

**Constitutional Framework for Fund Transfers:** The Constitution laid out a detailed framework for passing resources from the Federal government to the States. Articles 268 to 293 provide several methods for money flowing from the Centre to the State, creating a layered system to tackle vertical and horizontal imbalances.

These transfer mechanisms include:

- Duties imposed by the Centre but collected and retained by States (Article 268).
- Taxes imposed and collected by the Centre but entirely assigned to States (Article 269).
- Sharing of Union tax proceeds between the Centre and States (Article 270).
- Statutory grants-in-aid to States (Article 275).
- Grants for public purposes (Article 282).
- Loans for public purposes (Article 293).

The Finance Commission, convened every five years as per Article 280, recommends how these resources should be allocated. India's federal fiscal system stands out due to this method, which aids in balancing resource distribution.

**Mechanisms of Financial Transfers Resources** are moved from the Centre to States mainly through tax devolution and grants-in-aid. Tax devolution forms the bulk, making up over 80% of central transfers to states. States can use these devolved taxes according to their needs and priorities.

The divisible pool provides states with shares of corporation tax, personal income tax, Central GST, and the Centre's part of Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST). Initially, states only shared income tax and Union excise duties. Still, following the 80th Constitutional Amendment in 2000, all Union taxes and duties, excluding central sales tax, consignment taxes, surcharges, and earmarked cesses, were included.

Grants-in-aid form another crucial part of transfers. The 15th Finance Commission recommended these grants across several categories:

- 1. Revenue deficit grants: ₹2.9 lakh crore allocated to 17 states to bridge revenue deficits.
- 2. Sector-specific grants: ₹1.3 lakh crore dedicated to eight sectors, including health, education, and agriculture.
- 3. State-specific grants: ₹49,599 crores for social needs, infrastructure, and other specified requirements.
- 4. Grants to local bodies: ₹4.36 lakh crore for rural and urban local bodies, encompassing health grants.

Central Sector Schemes and Centrally Sponsored Schemes account for roughly 30% of funds allocated to states based on national priorities.

(IJRSSH) 2025, Vol. No. 15, Issue No. II, Apr-Jun

Vertical and Horizontal Devolution: Vertical devolution allocates resources between the Centre and the States as a whole, while horizontal devolution distributes them among individual states. Currently, states receive 41% of the divisible pool, as recommended by the 15th Finance Commission, maintaining the same percentage as in 2020-21. This represents a slight decrease from the 14th Finance Commission's recommendation of 42%, primarily due to Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh becoming Union Territories.

The 15th Finance Commission devised a formula for horizontal devolution based on specific criteria and weights:

Criterion	Weightage (%)	Purpose
Income Distance	45	Addresses income disparity per capita.
Population (2011 Census)	15	Reflects resource demand.
Area	15	Considers higher costs in larger states.
Demographic Performance	12.5	Rewards population control efforts.
Forest and Ecology	10	Compensates for ecological preservation.
Tax and Fiscal Efforts	2.5	Encourages efficient tax collection.

"Income distance" measures the gap from a state's income to Haryana's (the highest per capita income). Less wealthy states receive a larger share to maintain equality. "Demographic performance" rewards states that manage population growth better.

The devolution formula used by the 15th Finance Commission of India weighs six criteria to decide how central funds are shared among states:

- 1. Population (15%): Based on 2011 Census data, considering larger state populations.
- 2. Area (15%): Larger states get more to address administrative and infrastructure challenges.
- 3. Forest and Ecology (10%): Encourages maintaining forest cover and ecological balance.
- 4. Equity (45%): Ensures fair distribution, focusing on income distance or fiscal need.
- 5. Tax and Fiscal Efforts (2.5%): Rewards states improving revenue independently.
- 6. Demographic Performance (12.5%): Recognizes population control and demographic improvements. Total Weight: 100%

This formula balances developmental needs (population, area), environmental duties (forest and ecology), fiscal performance, and social advancement (demographics). The significant weight on equity (45%) highlights the importance of addressing regional disparities and ensuring inclusive growth.

**Challenges in the Current Devolution Framework:** The present devolution framework encounters multiple challenges. The Union government's cess and surcharge—about 23% of its gross tax receipts for 2024-25—fall outside the divisible pool and are not shared with states. This decreases the state's tax collections' genuine share from the Centre's total tax revenues.

Looking at figures: The Union government's total tax revenue reached ₹30.5 lakh crore (2022-23), ₹34.4 lakh crore (2023-24), and ₹38.8 lakh crore (2024-25). States received only ₹9.5 lakh crore, ₹11.0 lakh crore, and ₹12.2 lakh crore—around 32% of total tax revenues, not the advised 41%. States get different returns for every rupee they contribute to central taxes due to corporate headquarters' concentration in specific state capitals, where taxes are paid, and GST collection varies across states.

# Low Returns (Contributors)

Certain states contribute significantly more to the Union than they get back:

- Karnataka: Receives ₹0.15 for every ₹1 contributed, Tamil Nadu: ₹0.29,
- Telangana: ₹0.43, Andhra Pradesh: ₹0.49,Kerala: ₹0.57.

(IJRSSH) 2025, Vol. No. 15, Issue No. II, Apr-Jun

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These southern states are major revenue drivers for the Centre but receive much less in return, highlighting a fiscal challenge where wealthier states support redistribution yet get less aid.

# **Moderate Returns**

• **Rajasthan**: Receives ₹1.33, indicating a balanced inflow and outflow.

# High Returns (Net Beneficiaries): Some states receive much more than they contribute: Uttar Pradesh: ₹2.73, Bihar: ₹7.06

These poorer states have less revenue-generating capacity. The Finance Commission's formula promotes equity by channelling more funds to less developed areas to correct regional disparities.

The fiscal imbalance is apparent in the union-state relationship, where wealthier states subsidize poorer ones, often sparking debates about federal fairness, development incentives, and fiscal reform demands.

# **Quality of Life and Economic Disparities**

This financial gap highlights clear social and economic differences. Southern and Western states invest heavily in health, education, and infrastructure, which is reflected in improved quality of life. Southern India's literacy rate is 80%, notably higher than the North's 60%, resulting in better jobs and salaries.

# Share of States in Taxes (10th to 15th Finance Commission)

A chart titled "Share of States in Taxes" displays the percentage share of central taxes allocated to five major Indian states: Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh across six Finance Commissions.

# 3. Key Observations & Interpretation:

- 1. Uttar Pradesh (U.P.): Continuously holds the highest share, peaking in the 12th and 13th FC at 19.26% and 19.68%, respectively. While slightly declining in the 14th FC to 17.96%, it remains top at 17.94% in the 15th FC, reflecting its large population and economic demands.
- 2. **Maharashtra**: Reveals a steady rise from 4.63% in the 11th FC to 6.32% in the 15th FC. Its share has surpassed Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala in recent FCs, suggesting increased fiscal needs or formula adjustments.
- 3. **Tamil Nadu**: Experienced a drop from 6.64% in the 10th FC to about 4.02% in the 14th FC, with a slight recovery to 4.08% in the 15th FC due to demographic changes and income metrics.
- 4. **Karnataka**: Its tax contribution shows a downturn from 5.34% in the 10th FC to 3.65% in the 15th FC, and its efficient tax contribution does not align with high allocations, indicating need-based rather than contribution-driven fiscal devolution.
- 5. **Kerala**: It experienced a decline from 3.88% in the 10th FC to 1.93% in the 15th FC, the lowest among the five states. This shows the effects of demographic maturity and slower population growth, which carry less weight now.

The data emphasizes fiscal devolution discrepancies where contributing states like Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala receive a lower tax share while larger, less developed states such as Uttar Pradesh benefit more through criteria like population and income distance, sparking debate in interstate finance, especially in the South.

# 4. Policy Analysis of Tax Devolution Across Indian States (10th–15th Finance Commissions)

# Core Issue: Vertical vs Horizontal Fiscal Imbalance

- Vertical Imbalance: The disparity between the central government's revenue and the states' expenditure needs.
- Horizontal Imbalance: Discrepancies among states in revenue capacity and development requirements.

(IJRSSH) 2025, Vol. No. 15, Issue No. II, Apr-Jun

- The Finance Commission tries to address horizontal imbalances but often disappoints high-contributing states.
- South Indian States: States like Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala show decreases in their share despite being high-revenue generators with better development metrics.
- Uttar Pradesh and Bihar: With higher poverty and population, they still gain larger shares due to the Finance Commission's redistributive approach.
- Maharashtra: It slightly deviates, likely due to its increasing urbanization and fiscal needs, but it still faces an imbalance between its contribution and allocation.

#### **Policy Implications**

#### **Positive Outcomes**

- Formula-based devolution ensures fiscal levelling, enabling less-developed states to meet minimum public service standards.
- Encourages national unity by assisting backward regions in catching up.

#### Challenges

- Disincentivizes efficient states: States managing finances well receive less from the Centre, creating resentment.
- Distrust in federal relations: Efficient states feel punished, potentially pushing for more fiscal autonomy.
- Population-based formulas punish demographic management: Southern states that controlled population growth are penalized due to the emphasis on 2011 Census data.

#### **Policy Recommendations**

- 1. **Reform the Formula**: Introduce "Performance-based weightage" in allocations—reward fiscal discipline and improvements in education, health, and infrastructure; balance population metrics with HDI indicators.
- 2. **Fiscal Contribution Index**: Integrate states' tax contributions into the allocation formula to ensure fair "Give-Get Ratios."
- 3. Enhance Fiscal Autonomy: Grant high-performing states more autonomy in setting GST rates or imposing local cesses, fostering innovation and competition.
- 4. **Strengthen Direct Grants for Efficiency**: Implement special-purpose grants or challenge-based funds for states to meet development objectives beyond formulaic distribution.
- 5. **Promote Cooperative Federalism**: Regular Centre-State fiscal discussions under NITI Aayog or GST Council can address grievances and improve transparency.

# 5. Population Issues in Resource Sharing

The debate over North-South resource distribution revolves around population-based fund allocations. Southern states showed frustration at the 15th Finance Commission's reliance on the 2011 census for fund distribution. Good governance and social policies allowed southern states to manage population growth effectively, which now disadvantages them financially.

Southern states face setbacks in fund allocation due to effective population management. Kerala's Finance Minister T.S. Thomas Isaac notes this system contradicts true federalism and will harm India's federal structure.

Population control is just one governance aspect. The central question is whether funds should go to well-performing states or those needing more aid. The Finance Commission's formulas weigh income distance (45%) and population (15%) heavily, benefitting less developed states with larger populations. Southern states argue this system fails to acknowledge their effective growth efforts.

(IJRSSH) 2025, Vol. No. 15, Issue No. II, Apr-Jun

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# 6. GST: Freedom Versus Unity

GST has changed how states manage finances, particularly wealthier ones. Before GST, states could generate funds through indirect taxes for programs. Now, states have less control over revenues.

Tamil Nadu's Finance Minister, P. Thiaga Rajan, bluntly stated that shifting tax powers to GST prevents states from setting revenue policies. States now rely on central funds, creating disputes over allocation methods. In 2020, states nearly sued the central government after a prolonged battle for their GST compensation, indicating the fragility of Central-State financial relations post-GST.

#### 7. Political Power and Resource Distribution

Resource allocation is now closely linked to political representation concerns. The 2026 delimitation presents new challenges for southern states. Their success in controlling population growth may lower their parliamentary representation.

#### Southern states face three significant issues:

- 1. Less tax revenue due to good population management
- 2. Diminished political influence on national policies
- 3. Reduced flexibility to address development needs

Experts warn this could threaten India's federal structure.

Money from the South has funded northern growth, demonstrating national solidarity. Yet, southern states often feel overlooked for their achievements. The debate Centres on balancing fairness and need; one expert wisely suggested, "Let's talk about what's fair, not politics." India seeks the right balance to reward success while aiding struggling areas.

Population changes add complexity. Southern states' older population with fewer births needs workers from the North for job vacancies. Bihar illustrates these connections, as salaries from workers in other states contribute over 35% to its gross domestic product, creating complex regional financial dynamics.

# 8. The Way Forward to Redress North-South Imbalances

India requires pivotal reforms to close monetary divides between its northern and southern regions. Small adjustments won't suffice; the growing economic gulf threatens regional justice, India's growth model, and social unity. Targeted measures can help resolve disparities.

The Centre-State tax-sharing system needs a major overhaul. Presently, 23% of gross tax receipts stem from special taxes inaccessible to states. Adding these collections to the shared pool would immediately benefit states. The Centre could phase out specific taxes by adjusting tax rates, thereby enlarging the shared resource pool.

Distribution rules also need revising. The 15th Finance Commission prioritizes income differences (45%) and population (15%), and barely rewards tax efforts. An increased focus on efficiency would better acknowledge state contributions while aiding emergent areas.

Reforms require enlightened leadership at both the central and state levels to develop consensus beyond politics.

# The current formula describes a situation where:

- Wealthier states receive less than one rupee back for each rupee contributed.
- Poorer states gain more than one rupee for every rupee contributed.

Such interstate support makes sense in a diverse nation, yet it's reaching its limits. Southern states question how long they can sustain this arrangement.

GST offers new balance opportunities. The consumption-based tax is evenly divided between the Union and the State. States' GST contributions could become a future consideration factor for the Finance Commission, rewarding economic engagement while providing for where people spend.

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Monetary reforms alone aren't enough—better institutions are needed too. Establishing a formal system, like the GST Council, would empower states to shape the Finance Commission tasks. Such a system would bolster cooperative federalism, giving states meaningful influence over resource distribution.

Decentralization brings governments closer to populations and addresses local priorities. Properly managed, this curbs regional inequalities. Success hinges on building fiscal capabilities and enhanced governmental coordination.

A potential solution is granting states 50% of the shared tax pool. If politically impractical, reducing central schemes to prioritize education, healthcare, poverty programs, and employment could be feasible. This would allow states to address local needs while maintaining essential national programs.

Political representation matters as much as finances. The upcoming 2026 delimitation worries southern states with managed population growth. A complete solution must include both the financial and political facets of the North-South dialogue.

Fair regional development involves investing in slower-growing areas while acknowledging robust states' contributions. Beyond math, it's about effective federalism, maintaining India's unity, and respecting local diversity and initiatives. Reforms can transform recognized win-lose games into mutual-benefit frameworks.

Southern states have noticed their share in the divisible pool decline over time because equity (income gap) and needs (population, area, and forest) are more weighted than efficiency measures (demographic performance and tax effort).

Recent reports indicate the Centre might propose the 16th Finance Commission to reduce the states' share from 41% to 40%. A 1% cut could earn the central government roughly ₹3,500 crore more.

The Centre disbursed ₹1.73 trillion to state governments in January 2025, up from ₹89,086 crore in December 2024, helping states enhance capital spending and fund development initiatives. FY25's budget projections suggest states will receive ₹12.2 trillion, a 10.4% rise from the revised FY24 figures.

**Potential Reforms for Balanced Devolution:** Several reforms may enhance equity and federalism. The divisible pool might expand by including some cess and surcharge. The Centre might also gradually phase out numerous cesses and surcharges by altering tax brackets.

States' contributions could be acknowledged more by assigning more weight to efficiency criteria in horizontal devolution. As GST, a consumption-based destination tax, is equally divided between the Union and the States, upcoming Finance Commissions could regard the States' contribution to GST.

A formal system for states to engage in the Finance Commission's organization and work could fortify cooperative federalism, providing states greater influence in resource allocation akin to the GST Council.

The economic divide between India's northern and southern regions has sparked robust debates on resource allocation and sharing, which are deeply embedded within the country's fiscal structure. The financial dynamics between these areas expose complex patterns of economic inputs, population shifts, and wealth distribution policies shaping India's growth narrative.


**Analyzing Resource Transfer Imbalance:** The financial movement between India's central and state governments seems misaligned. The central government raises about 63-64% of revenues but expends only 43%, whereas states gather merely 36-37% but handle 57% of spending. This gap necessitates the Centre to transfer substantial sums to states, with some states receiving more than initially contributed.

Southern states, despite delivering better economic outcomes, feel they are shortchanged. Karnataka contributes nearly 10% to the Centre's tax collection but only gets back 5%. Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Telangana also express dissatisfaction over insufficient support for weaker regions without adequate acknowledgment.

(IJRSSH) 2025, Vol. No. 15, Issue No. II, Apr-Jun

Southern states' major grievances regarding resource sharing include:

- **Declining tax share**: Tamil Nadu's revenue share nosedived from 5.305% to 4.079%. Karnataka's decreased from 4.459% to 3.647%, and Kerala's from 2.665% to 1.925%.
- **Perceived economic injustice**: Southern states contribute nearly 25% of tax revenue but receive significantly less compensation from the central government.
- Less financial autonomy: Post-GST implementation, states found it hard to raise revenue independently, becoming more reliant on central funds.
- **Diminished political influence risk**: The 2026 delimitation could reduce the number of parliamentary seats for southern states, which are already receiving less funding.



What States Get for Every Rupee They Contribute (2021-22)

This bar chart visually depicts the return each state in India receives from the Union Government for every ₹1 it contributes to the central pool, per 2021–22 data.

# 9. Conclusion

India's fiscal federalism is pivotal in managing North-South financial links. Resource allocation and demographic changes have sparked state tensions. Southern states contribute significantly in taxes but gain less, while northern states still need assistance for development.

The Finance Commission tries to balance these diverse needs with its distribution formulas. Current systems, while well-intentioned, face challenges from both regions. Southern states object to population-based allocations, while northern areas struggle to close gaps despite receiving more funds.

The GST system has reshaped states' fiscal management and relations with the central government. States now depend increasingly on central transfers, turning distribution formulas into a debate point. Southern states' population control actions disadvantage them in funding allocations. This highlights the need for revised allocation principles to balance efficiency and fairness.

Several reform options could unify states. Increasing resource pools, updating distribution metrics, and strengthening institutions to bridge gaps are essential. States should have stronger resource distribution, like through the GST Council.

Progress requires political determination for comprehensive reforms while maintaining national unity. Future Commissions must balance state interests without compromising development objectives. States should work together

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to pursue economic growth across India's dynamic regions. The existing tax-sharing structure ensures no state is left behind, yet it must evolve to incentivize efficiency and innovation. Balancing equity with incentives is vital to preserving Indian federalism's cooperative spirit as the country advances toward Viksit Bharat @2047.

## **10. Conflict of Interest**

The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

## **11. Funding Declaration**

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**Prof. B. Sudhakar Reddy** is a distinguished Professor of Economics and the Director of ICSSR-SRC in Hyderabad. He holds a PhD from Osmania University and has held various administrative positions throughout his career. He has guided 23 Ph. D.s, and his research encompasses a wide range of subjects, including women's empowerment, globalization, and economic reforms. He has organized seminars and research methodology courses, contributing significantly to academic literature. An active member of various professional bodies, he demonstrates a strong commitment to academic excellence, research contributions, and leadership.

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